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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 04-2436
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       
   v.
CHRISTOPHER SMITH,
                    Appellant.
               
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 02-cr-00172-26)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 23, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
____________
(Filed: November 1, 2007)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Christian Smith appeals his conviction and sentence stemming from his
participation in a vast drug-dealing operation.  For the reasons expressed below, we will
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the District Court. 
I.
Appellant Christopher Smith, along with 36 co-conspirators, participated in a
massive cocaine and cocaine base (crack) conspiracy spanning Philadelphia, Western
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and other locations.  From 1997 through 2002, the conspiracy,
conservatively estimated, distributed approximately 600 kilograms of cocaine and 400
kilograms of cocaine base.  The conspiracy also occasioned a variety of substantive drug
possession and drug distribution crimes and numerous acts of violence, including murder.
For his role in the operation, a jury convicted Smith on three counts:  conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base (Count One), and two counts of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Counts 119 and 121).  
Subsequently, the District Court made various findings of fact and ultimately
sentenced Smith to life imprisonment plus terms of five and 25 years, to run
consecutively.  Smith now appeals on three grounds.  He claims that the judicial fact-
finding during his sentencing violated United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that
the wrongful fact-finding subjected him to double jeopardy and cruel and unusual
punishment, and that there was insufficient evidence of the possession of firearms used in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  While Smith’s arguments concerning Counts 119
3and 121 are meritless, the Government concedes that the Court wrongfully applied a
mandatory Guidelines regime in sentencing Smith on Count One.  Accordingly, we will
affirm the judgment of sentence as to Counts 119 and 121, but we will vacate the
judgment of sentence as to Count One, and remand for resentencing in accordance with
Booker.   
II.
Smith’s appeal of Counts 119 and 121 on sentencing grounds fails as the District
Court properly determined facts relevant to sentencing.  Contrary to Smith’s contention,
judicial fact-finding during sentencing is appropriate, so long as the District Court does
not apply the resulting Guidelines level in a mandatory fashion and the final sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum.  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30
(3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Giaguinto, 441 F.3d 195, 196 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here, the
District Court met those two requirements.  First, the Court did not apply a sentence
under the Guidelines to the firearm possession convictions at all, mandatory or otherwise,
instead sentencing Smith according to the statutory mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A).  See United States v. Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 449 (3d Cir. 2006).  That
statute provides for a five-year minimum sentence for possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and a 25-year minimum sentence for a second
such conviction.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  Second, the jury verdicts as to Counts 119
and 121 authorized penalties of life imprisonment.  As the Court found facts supporting
sentences of five and 25 years—below the maximum sentences authorized by the jury
4verdict—the resulting sentences were in accordance with prevailing caselaw.  See
Williams, 464 F.3d at 449 (citing Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (“[A]
judge may make findings of fact that increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum
sentence as long as those findings do not extend the sentence beyond the maximum
authorized by the jury’s verdict.”)).  
Smith’s sentence as to Count One, however, fails to adhere to these requirements. 
The Government concedes that the District Court sentenced Smith under the mandatory
Guidelines regime then in effect (not under any applicable mandatory minimum, as
above).  We held in United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc)
that where a district court applies the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion, prejudice is
presumed and a remand for resentencing is required.  Accordingly, we will vacate the
judgment of sentence as to Count One and remand for resentencing in accordance with
Booker.  
III.
Smith’s final argument on appeal—that there was insufficient evidence for the jury
to convict him of both counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime—fails as well.  When deciding whether a jury verdict rests on legally
sufficient evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States v. Dent, 149
F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).  Given the incriminating testimony by Smith’s co-
5conspirators, the ballistics evidence, the testimony of the medical examiner, the
corroboration by eyewitnesses, and even the recovery of the firearms used during the
incident on February 26, 2000, the jury was amply justified in finding that Smith was
guilty of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug conspiracy on the two occasions
charged.  See United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990).  
IV. 
For these reasons we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                          
